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Creative Industries After the First Decade of Debate
Terry Flew and Stuart Cunningham
Creative Industries Faculty, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
It has now been over a decade since the concept of creative in-5
dustries was first put into the public domain by the Blair Labour
government’s Creative Industries Mapping Documents in Britain.
The concept has developed traction globally, but it has also been
understood and developed in different ways in Europe, Asia, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and North America, and also in international10
bodies such as UNCTAD and UNESCO. A review of the policy lit-
erature reveals that although questions and issues remain around
definitional coherence, there is some degree of consensus emerging
about the size, scope, and significance of the sectors in question in
both advanced and developing economies. At the same time, debate15
about the concept remains highly animated in media, communica-
tion, and cultural studies, with its critics dismissing the concept out-
right as a harbinger of neoliberal ideology in the cultural sphere.
This article couches such critiques in light of recent debates sur-
rounding the intellectual coherence of the concept of neoliberalism,20
arguing that this term itself possesses problems when taken outside
of the Anglo-American context in which it originated. It is argued
that issues surrounding the nature of participatory media culture,
the relationship between cultural production and economic innova-
tion, and the future role of public cultural institutions can be devel-25
oped from within a creative industries framework, and that writ-
ing off such arguments as a priori ideological and flawed does little
to advance debates about twenty-century information and media
culture.
Keywords creative industries, creativity, cultural policy, globaliza-30
tion, information society, innovation, media, neoliberal-
ism, the arts
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INTRODUCTION: CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
POLICIES AROUND THE WORLD
The concept of creative industries emerged in the late 35
1990s primarily as a policy discourse, although the sub-
sequent decade has seen a lively set of academic as well
as industry and policy-related debates about its utility and
implications for research, criticism, and creative practice.
Its origins can be traced to the decision of the then newly 40
elected British Labour government of Tony Blair to estab-
lish a Creative Industries Task Force (CITF), as a central
activity of its new Department of Culture, Media and Sport
(DCMS). The story of the CITF has been told by vari-
ous sources (Hartley 2005; Pratt 2005; O’Connor 2007; 45
Hesmondhalgh 2007) and is not recounted in detail here,
except to note its four major contributions.
First, it established the creative industries as a central
plank of the United Kingdom’s “postindustrial” economy,
observing that the sector accounted for 5 percent of total 50
national income in 1998, employed 1.4 million people, and
was growing at about double the rate of the British econ-
omy as a whole. Estimates in the United States were that
the creative industries account for 7–9 percent of gross
national product (Americans for the Arts 2008; Siwek 55
2006), while countries as diverse as Australia, Singapore,
South Africa, and China were identifying figures in the
range of 3–5 percent (UNCTAD 2008; Cunningham and
Higgs 2008). Second, it marked out the continuation of
a trend, first identifiable in cultural policy in the United 60
Kingdom and Australia in the 1980s and early 1990s, to
view cultural sectors as contributors to wealth creation
and economic performance, and not simply as claimants
on public revenues on the basis of nonmarket or intrin-
sic values. Third, by approaching the creative industries 65
in ways that went beyond the traditional discourses of the
subsidized arts, and giving a central role to creativity in the
generation of economic wealth, debates about these sec-
tors moved into larger discourses such as those of trade
policy, copyright and intellectual property, urban devel- 70
opment, and educational futures. Finally, in developing a
diverse and eclectic list of industries that ranged from com-
mercial media to publicly subsidized arts, the live-analog
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and the digital-multimedia, and those with largely one-
off artisanal modes of cultural production to complex and75
highly capitalized sites of cultural production, creative in-
dustries were explicitly linked to discourses surrounding
technological convergence, the information society and
the “new economy” (Flew 2005a).
The creative industries policy discourse was taken up80
in a number of other countries. Singapore and Hong Kong
developed detailed analyses of their creative industries
sectors that were strongly influenced by the UK model.
The concept also gained policy purchase in Taiwan, Ko-
rea, and, in the hybrid form of “cultural creative indus-85
tries,” in China (Kong, Gibson, Khoo, and Semple 2006;
Keane 2007). The European Union (EU) identified the cul-
tural sectors as experiencing employment growth that was
four to five times the EU average, and noted that the cul-
tural workforce was pioneering wider trends in European90
labor markets, such as higher rates of self-employment,
high levels of tertiary education, and a greater propor-
tion of the workforce in temporary or contract jobs (KEA
2006). Most European governments were hesitant to adopt
the British formulation of creative industries, preferring95
to talk of the cultural industries or the cultural sectors,
whereas some Scandinavian countries talked of the cre-
ative economy or the experience economy. Creative indus-
tries was also taken up by governments in Australia and
New Zealand, although in the Australian case it was state100
governments, such as the Queensland government, that
were the more enthusiastic proponents of creative indus-
tries policies (Craik 2007). In the United States, the com-
parative weakness of national cultural policies is offset
by a patchwork of subnational strategies, where state and105
local governments undertake diverse initiatives to bolster
the arts and entertainment industries, often with the pur-
pose of rebadging their city or region as a hub of creativity
(Wyszomirski 2008). On a global scale the United Nations
Commission on Trade, Aid, and Development (UNCTAD)110
has become an enthusiastic proponent of the creative in-
dustries as a new engine of growth in developing countries
(Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright 2008; UNCTAD 2008),
while the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) has significantly upgraded115
its statistical frameworks to incorporate the size, scope and
significance of cultural production in the global economy
(UNESCO 2007).
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEFINITIONAL COHERENCE
The early list-based approach to creative industries devel-120
oped in the UK context by DCMS was open to the charge
of ad hoc–ery, as it was not clear what were the under-
lying threads linking this seemingly heterogeneous set of
industry subsectors (Flew 2002). The list drew together
industries that were highly capitalized and industrialized125
in their modes of production and distribution (e.g., film
and television), and those that were more labor-intensive
and artisanal (arts and crafts, designer fashion, music, the
visual and performing arts), as well as combining highly
commercial sectors marked by the business cycle (e.g., 130
advertising, architecture), with arts sectors largely driven
by public subsidy. Critics of the DCMS approach, such
as Nicholas Garnham (2005), argued that the inclusion
of the software, computer games, and electronic publish-
ing industries had the effect of artificially inflating the size 135
and economic significance of the creative industries, while
David Hesmondhalgh (2007) questioned the exclusion
of sectors such as heritage, tourism, entertainment, and
sport.
The two lines of demarcation proposed in the original 140
DCMS definition—individual creativity that could take
the form of intellectual property—did little to clarify what
Andy Pratt (2005) described as the “breadth question” in
differentiating the creative industries from other sectors,
while Chirs Bilton and Ruth Leary (2002, 50) observed 145
that “it is difficult to think of a product which does not ex-
ploit some intellectual component in the form of patents,
design elements or other intangible, symbolic properties
which make that product unique,” The focus on intellec-
tual property also raised concerns that in the shift from 150
cultural to creative industries, the result would be a one-
sided focus upon that which was “new,” produced through
digital technologies, and commercially oriented, losing
sight of the complex cultural ecologies that link commer-
cial and publicly supported form of cultural production, as 155
well as links between digital and tangible arts and media
forms. This focus upon the link between creativity and
intellectual property also raised concerns about the risks
of subordinating culture to the commercial market in the
shift from cultural to creative industries (Hesmondhalgh 160
2008).
The 2000s have seen increasing consensus emerge
among policymakers about working definitions of the cre-
ative industries and what sectors should or should not
be included, albeit with some debates about what should 165
be considered to be “core” creative or cultural industries.
Work undertaken for UNESCO in developing its revised
Framework for Cultural Statistics (UNESCO 2007) has
compared the cultural statistics frameworks of fourteen
constituencies (ten countries, one region, one city, the 170
European Union, and the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization) and has found that a consensus exists around
inclusion of the following sectors in cultural statistics
modeling:
1. Publishing and literature. 175
2. Performing arts.
3. Music.
4. Film, video, and photography.
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5. Broadcasting (television and radio).
6. Visual arts and crafts.180
7. Advertising.
8. Design, including fashion.
9. Museums, galleries, and libraries.
10. Interactive media (Web, games, mobile, etc.).
Sectors for which there continues to be debate about185
their inclusion in a cultural statistics framework include ar-
chitecture, software, product and reception hardware (e.g.,
musical instruments, electronic goods), festivals, intangi-
ble cultural heritage, and leisure activities, including sport.
Nonetheless, considerable progress has been made in de-190
veloping common statistical and analytical frameworks
that enable the development of empirically robust data
that can be compared between countries and analyzed
over time, thus allowing for more speculative claims to
be subject to detailed policy-related performance metrics.195
This can be seen in the work of UNCTAD on creative in-
dustries and the creative economy, which has been able to
develop a sectoral taxonomy of the creative industries be-
tween the arts, media, heritage, and “functional creations”
(or more service-oriented sectors), around the following200
broad definition of the creative industries:! The cycles of creation, production, and distribution of goods
and services that use creativity and intellectual capital as
primary inputs;! A set of knowledge-based activities, focused on but not lim-
Q1
205
ited to the arts, potentially generating revenues from trade
and intellectual property rights;
! Tangible products and intangible intellectual or artistic ser-
vices with creative content, economic value, and market ob-
jectives; 210! At the cross-roads among the artisan, services, and industrial
sectors; and! Comprising a new dynamic sector in world trade. (UNCTAD
2008, 13)
Figure 1 shows how these principles link up to sec- 215
tors and categories that constitute the creative industries
worldwide.
The question of what relationship exists between the
public and private sectors in creative industries develop-
ment has also been clarified significantly. Rather than be- 220
ing a discourse that simply champions commercial pop-
ular culture as the obverse of traditional “market failure”
rationales for arts and cultural funding, what has instead
been emerging is a better understanding of the enabling
role of public-sector institutions and government-funded 225
cultural activities as drivers of innovation and socially net-
worked markets (Cunningham et al. 2008). John Holden
has observed that “as greater numbers of people are en-
gaging with the content and spaces of publicly-funded
culture . . . the working lives of greater numbers of people 230
are taking on the characteristics and processes of cultural
practitioners” (Holden 2007, 8). The public sector has typ-
ically been seen as both an enabler of commercial creative
industries, assisting with the development and provision
of inputs, including people with creative skills, as well as 235
having responsibility for the empirical “mapping” of these
sectors and their economic impacts (Holden 2007). Since
FIG. 1. UNCTAD model of the creative industries. Source: UNCTAD (2008, 14).
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the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent eco-
nomic downturn, public-sector organizations are increas-
ingly being looked to for taking the lead on innovation in240
the creative industries sectors (Pratt 2009).
CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
INFORMATION SOCIETY REDUX?
Cultural economist David Throsby (2008) has observed
that the distinctions made between cultural and creative245
industries arise from a mix of inherent definitional diffi-
culties in delineating “culture” and “creativity”; distinc-
tive national traditions in understanding these categories;
and the politics of cultural policy and the impact of gov-
ernment priorities at the time on how the relevant sectors250
are defined and their roles conceptualized. Such questions
arise, for Throsby, in a context where “the very status of
cultural policy has been changing in a number of coun-
tries as a result of the emergence of the cultural industries
as an object of interest to economic policy-makers”; a255
growing interest in culture as a source of economic value-
adding is seeing “cultural policy . . . rescued from its pri-
mordial past and catapulted to the forefront of the modern
forward-looking policy agenda, an essential component
in any respectable economic policy-maker”s development260
strategy” (Throsby 2008, 229).
Cultural economists often use the terms cultural and
creative industries interchangeably, as their primary focus
is upon the mix of product qualities and consumer needs
that renders a particular commodity, activity, or service to265
be deemed cultural (Towse 2003). In other accounts, most
notably the work of Throsby (2001, 2008), arts and cultural
industries are the respective core subsets of the creative
industries in what is known as the “concentric circles” ap-
proach, where industries are distinguished by the “core”270
role given to creativity in the input stage of production
(e.g., the visual arts would be seen as a “core,” but adver-
tising would be seen as more “peripheral” as it combines
creative inputs with other inputs). From the economic per-
spective, industry classifications are loose taxonomies that275
have to fit upon the shifting nexus of supply-demand rela-
tionships between individuals and firms; the classification
of commodities and markets is analytically prior to that of
industries.
In the critical humanities, by contrast, the political and280
ideological weight given to these different signifiers of
an industry is substantially greater. The term “cultural in-
dustry” has its origins in neo-Marxist philosophy, where
the rise of industrialized cultural production in the early
twentieth century was seen—and is still seen by many285
critical theorists—as promoting “class rule,” a “capitalist
lifestyle” and an “administered society” (terms taken from
Edgar 2008). There has, however, been a turn away from
a monolithic and pessimistic model of “culture industry”
since the 1970s, marked not only by a conceptual shift to a 290
more empirically based understanding of how production,
distribution, and circulation actually worked in these quite
varied industries, but also by a greater interest in the policy
settings that could enable these sectors to grow while fur-
thering social-democratic agendas to democratize access 295
to and participation in the cultural sphere. In his highly
influential work for the left-wing Greater London Council
in the early 1980s, political economist Nicholas Garnham
argued against what he termed the “idealist” tradition in
cultural policy that rejected markets as incompatible with 300
culture, pointing out that “most people’s cultural needs
and aspirations are being, for better or worse, supplied
by the market as goods and services” (Garnham 1987,
25). Garnham instead argued for approaches that would
better understand how the cultural industries worked as 305
“institutions . . . which employ the characteristic modes of
production and organization of industrial corporations to
produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural
goods and services generally, although not exclusively, as
commodities” (ibid.). The intention was to enable cultural 310
policymakers to better identify the scope to intervene in
cultural markets in order to further access and participa-
tion agendas, rather than reject cultural industries and the
commodity form tout court.
It is worth noting, then, that Garnham subsequently 315
came to be one of the more trenchant critics of creative
industries theory and policy discourse, claiming that it
inappropriately smuggles in arguments and assumptions
associated with the information society. Garnham (2005,
20) agues that the shift from cultural to creative industries 320
is opportunistic, “an attempt by the cultural sector and the
cultural policy community to share in its relations with the
government... the unquestioned prestige that now attach to
the information society and to any policy that supposedly
favors its development.” Moreover, in the British context 325
of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s “New Labour,” cre-
ative industries was perceived as a policy Trojan horse
to promote “the shift to and reinforcement of ‘economic’
and ‘managerial’ language and patterns of thought within
cultural and media policy” (ibid., 16). This critique of 330
creative industries as a form of ideological mystification
has also been made by David Hesmondhalgh (2008, 567),
who proposed that it is based upon “arguments which all
too often come close to endorsing inequality and exploita-
tion associated with contemporary neo-liberalisms,” and 335
by Andrew Ross, who suspected the new policy rubric
of being “‘old wine in new bottles’—a glib production
of spin-happy new Labourites, hot for naked marketiza-
tion but mindful of the need for socially acceptable dress”
(Ross 2007, 18). 340
The creative industries concept shares with informa-
tion society theories an interest in the long-term shift in
employment and national income from agriculture and
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manufacturing to services in advanced capitalist
economies; the limitations of “industrial era” statistical345
modeling in capturing the economic dynamics of services
and information-based sectors; and the growing role of
knowledge capital as a primary driver of growth in these
economies (David and Foray 2002). In terms of the five
sets of arguments that Garnham associates with informa-350
tion society thinking (for another accounts of the infor-
mation society, see Hassan 2008), theories of the service
economy and post-Fordist flexible production models have
been most influential, with transaction cost-based theories
of the firm helping to shape some economic accounts of355
creative industries (e.g., Caves 2000), and Schumpete-
rian models of innovation and entrepreneurship influenc-
ing thinking about the significance of small-to-medium
firms as incubators of innovation and new business mod-
els in the arts, media, and cultural sectors (Cunningham360
et al. 2008).
Notions of the Internet and digital media as “technolo-
gies of freedom” have had more influence on the growing
literature on the significance of networks and collaborative
social production (e.g., Benkler 2006) than on creative in-365
dustries theories. Daniel Bell’s original thinking about the
information society has had only limited influence, with
most accounts of the creative industries being consider-
ably more circumspect about proclaiming a postindus-
trial utopia for the creative workforce, and there has been370
considerable recognition of the question of precarious la-
bor that often underpins contract employment and flexible
working arrangements (Deuze 2006; Cunningham 2008).
Indeed, creative industries theorists have often pointed to
the limitations of information society models, arguing that375
a focus on human creativity—often derided among criti-
cal theorists as a residue of bourgeois individualism and a
romanticisation of the artist (Miller 2002; Donald 2004)—
is an important corrective to policies overly focused upon
infrastructure and technological hardware to the detriment380
of human factors and social software (Mitchell et al. 2003;
Hartley 2005; Cunningham 2009b).
Garnham’s (2005, 16) claim that creative industries dis-
course “assumes that we already know, and thus can take
for granted, what the creative industries are, why they are385
important and thus merit supporting policy initiatives” is
also open to question, particularly if we shift our focus
outside of its origins in Great Britain under Tony Blair’s
New Labour. Cunningham’s (2007; 2009b) evaluation of
1200 creative industries policy documents developed out-390
side of the United Kingdom from 1998 to 2006 found a
high degree of incrementalism, policy variance, and atten-
tion to local contextual factors, rather than an unreflexive
blanket imposition of neoliberal rational–comprehensive
orthodoxies about the proper culture–economy relation-395
ship. In very general terms, a global scan of this policy
literature finds four main variants:
! A United States model, where there is a substan-
tive divide in thinking and calculation toward arts
and culture on the one hand and the entertain- 400
ment/copyright industries on the other, and where
the bulk of policy initiatives are highly localized
and subnational in their focus, as seen with the rise
of the “creative cities” movement (Wyszomirski
2008). 405! A European model that emphasizes the cultural
mission of these industries and strategies for so-
cial inclusion for common cultural benefit and
where the term “cultural industries” is generally
preferred to that of creative industries. 410! A diverse range of Asian approaches, which
strongly emphasize the role of national sociocul-
tural and political circumstances, but still iden-
tify opportunities for export growth and success-
ful branding of global city-region in the highly 415
competitive Asia-Pacific region, while at the same
time challenging long-held orthodoxies about in-
strumentalist education and the dominance of the
ICT sectors in driving economic growth (cf. Kong
et al. 2006). 420! Developing country models in South America,
South Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere, where
questions of cultural heritage maintenance,
poverty alleviation, and provision of basic infras-
tructure have precluded overly technocratic con- 425
ceptions of creative industries being promoted un-
critically as the inevitable fruits of the information
society (UNCTAD 2008).
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND CULTURAL POLICY
What has been traced in this article thus far is the man- 430
ner in which the rise of creative industries as both theory
and policy discourse has intersected with changing under-
standings of the relationship of the arts, the media and ap-
plied creativity to new media technologies, globalization
and the twenty-first century knowledge-based economy. 435
Over the period from the initial development of creative
industries in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s to the
present, there has been a refining of definitions, models,
agreements of what industries are included or excluded,
and measurement techniques. This has reached the point 440
where recent work undertaken through bodies such as UN-
ESCO (2007) and UNCTAD (2008) is generating more
statistically robust data on the size, scope, and signifi-
cance of the creative industries on a global scale, which
rests upon stronger empirical foundation than the more 445
ad hoc or speculative accounts that prevailed in the late
1990s. At the same time, there are significant variations
in national and regional adaptations of the creative indus-
tries template from the form in which it first emerged in
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the United Kingdom, in contrast to claims that it is sim-450
ply the reflection of a singular “master discourse,” such as
the information society, exported from Tony Blair’s “Cool
Britannia.” A distinction that could be further explored is
the difference in applications of the concept between Eu-
rope and Asia. Europe has tended toward what has been455
referred to as the “concentric circles” model, where arts-
related activities are seen as being in the “core” creative
industries, whereas fields such as advertising, architec-
ture, and design as well as media industries are seen as
only being partially creative (Throsby 2001; KEA 2006;460
Work Foundation 2007). By contrast, Asian definitions
of the creative industries have tended to be more eclectic
and inclusive. Indeed, it has been argued in the Chinese
case that it may be used in too inclusive a manner, with
what Keane (2007) refers to as the “super-sign” of cre-465
ativity being applied to areas as diverse as hairdressing,
theme parks, and furniture manufacture in order to bolster
claims that creative industries are central to a “new China”
that can move beyond being the global center of low-cost
manufacturing.470
Although policy discourses are tending to settle around
creative industries, if not necessarily converging, the gulf
between creative industries theory and policy discourse
and the positions of critical theorists remains wide, and
has almost certainly widened over the 2000s. Various ar-475
guments have been made that creative industries subtly
endorse neoliberal marketisation (Hesmondhalgh 2008),
have been inappropriately used as consultancy-speak
(Miller 2009), give a positive spin to the activities and
products of global media corporations (Kellner 2009), and480
ignore the plight of precarious labor (Rossiter 2006). At
one level, such critiques can be understood as an extension
of debates in the 1990s about cultural policy studies, and
whether there is a need to incorporate policy considera-
tions into the study of culture as a field shaped by govern-485
mental practices and discourses (Bennett 1998). A lot of
the critical debate about creative industries can be seen as
a variant of earlier debates about whether a focus upon the
pragmatic, ad hoc, ameliorative and “ideas-thick” realm
of public policymaking appears inadequate and compro-490
mised in the eyes of those who champion the transfor-
mative, heroic, programmatic and “ideas-rich” realms of
cultural critique and the critical humanities (Cunningham
1992).
However, the stakes have been upped in creative indus-495
tries debates from the cultural policy debate of the 1990s.
One major reason is that larger claims are being made
about the broader socioeconomic significance of culture
and creativity arising from transformations in the techno-
logical and economic substructure of twenty-first-century500
global capitalism. As a result, creative industries discourse
seeks to engage not only with the public sector and reg-
ulated cultural industries, but also with a wider range of
knowledge and service industries, professions, and prac-
tices. This means that the focus has shifted toward whether 505
creative industries are loci of innovation and employment
growth in increasingly knowledge-based economies; cul-
tural policy is moving from arts subsidy and advocacy to
the center stage of economic growth policies in postindus-
trial economies, at the level of cities, regions, or nations. 510
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND THE GREAT
NEOLIBERALISM DEBATE
At the core of the critical theorists’ dissent with creative
industries is the claim that it promotes neoliberalism as
a political ideology, and that this furthers the hegemony 515
of multinational corporate capital over the cultural sphere.
Miller finds that “neoliberal creative industries discourse”
has been promoted by “carpet-bagging consultants” push-
ing a “cybertarian mythology,” while “the cultural indus-
tries remain under the control of media conglomerates” 520
(Miller 2009, 188, 190, 194). Des Friedman views the rise
of creative industries discourse in the United Kingdom as
part of a larger project of “the neo-liberalization of me-
dia policy,” which “is designed to transform the existing
balance of power . . . to assist the expansion of private 525
accumulation and to undermine the legitimacy and exis-
tence of non-profit and public service media provision”
(Freedman 2008, 224).
The claim of complicity with neoliberalism is a more
serious charge directed at creative industries arguments 530
than those concerning what industries are included or ex-
cluded, or whether it is helpful to differentiate creativity
and culture in understanding sectoral dynamics and their
policy implications. Neoliberalism as a concept emerged
in the late 1990s and early 2000s as an omnibus term used 535
by activists to critique and protest institutions and forums
associated with globalization, such as the World Trade Or-
ganization and its inaugural meeting in Seattle in 1999, and
summits of world leaders such as the Group of Eight (G8)
Summit in Genoa in 2001 and the Group of Twenty (G20) 540
Summit in London in 2009. As the critique of neoliber-
alism developed in international economics in the 1990s,
it also referred to what has also been termed the “Wash-
ington Consensus,” where the application of a common
set of policies based around fiscal austerity, privatization 545
of publicly owned assets, and market liberalization was
the common recommendation of U.S.-based international
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank for developing countries facing economic
difficulties (Stiglitz 2002). 550
Critics would see neoliberalism and globalization as be-
ing connected. Scholte (2005, 1) refers to neoliberal glob-
alization as “an economically driven process that should
proceed on first principles of private property and unin-
hibited market forces,” and where “other economic rules 555
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and institutions are ‘political interferences’ that under-
mine market efficiency and should therefore be reduced to
a minimum.” Neo-Marxists such as David Harvey (2005)
identified neoliberalism as a global strategy to reassert the
class power of business and economic elites that has its ori-560
gins in the ideas and policies that shaped the Thatcher and
Major governments in Britain from 1979 to 1997 and the
Reagan administration in the United States in the 1980s.
Harvey (ibid., 2) defined neoliberalism as “[a] theory of
political economic practices that proposes that human565
well being can best be advanced by liberating individ-
ual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institu-
tional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade.” Harvey’s neo-Marxist
critique sits alongside neo-Foucauldian accounts such as570
those of the British political theorist Nikolas Rose, who
identifies neoliberalism with the association (found on
the libertarian left as well as among many conservatives)
of “notions of freedom, and the associated celebration
of the powers of the individual . . . whether as discerning575
customer, enterprising individual, subject of right or au-
tonomous fellow human” (Rose 1999, 64). While this may
sound like a somewhat academic debate in some circles,
the range of anti-corporate and anti-globalization protests
over the 2000s has kept the term on the agenda, while the580
global financial crisis that began in October 2008 saw such
apparently establishment figures as the Australian Prime
Minister, Kevin Rudd (2009), attributing the severity of
the crisis to the impact of neoliberal policies and “extreme
capitalism.”585
Debates about neoliberalism and creative industries are
connected through three factors. The first is the “New
Labour” administrations that governed Britain under Blair
and Gordon Brown. As the Blair Labour government pro-
vided much of the early thought leadership about creative590
industries being in the vanguard of a postindustrial “Cool
Britannia,” creative industries has tended to be seen as pro-
totypical of that government’s “Third Way” ideology. The
second factor was the focus upon markets, entrepreneur-
ship, and intellectual property found in the creative indus-595
tries literature, which, it was argued, did not adequately
consider the ways in which capitalist markets could pro-
duce inequalities of access or shape cultural forms in ways
that may be deemed at odds with wider notions of the pub-
lic or social good (Hesmondhalgh 2007). Finally, the focus600
upon new industries, emergent markets, and the small-
to-medium enterprise (SME) sector cut across traditional
policy divides, with neoliberals focusing on the economic
case for greater competition and on the opportunities pre-
sented by new technologies and reduced public-sector in-605
tervention, and the left focusing on the social case for
public ownership, regulation, and public subsidy of the
arts (Flew 2005b, 2006). Since creative industries did not
speak the language of the traditional left—a mix of cul-
tural Marxism, suspicion of markets and commercial en- 610
terprise, and enthusiasm for the regulatory state—it was
easy to see it as a feint toward the political dark side among
those associating their own positions with those of with
the traditional left, wondering whether “neo-liberal em-
phases on creativity have succeeded old-school cultural 615
patrimony” (Miller 2009, 187).
ADDRESSING THE CRITIQUE OF CREATIVE
INDUSTRIES AS NEOLIBERALISM
A wider critique of neoliberalism as an explanatory con-
cept is beyond the scope of this article, but points that have 620
been raised in relation to creative industries can be ad-
dressed. The association of the creative industries concept
with “New Labour” governments in Britain has enabled
critics to tie the concept to a wider meta-narrative about ne-
oliberalism as a political-ideological project of dominant 625
economic elites, with terms such as the “new economy”
and “creative industries” as ideological obfuscations de-
signed to disguise the extent to which they had essentially
accepted the policies of their conservative predecessors.
Both Hesmondhalgh (2007) and Freedman (2008) struc- 630
ture their analysis of media policy since 1980 in precisely
these terms, and it is the dominant approach taken by po-
litical economists more generally (see, e.g., Curran 2006;
McChesney 2008).
The notion that we have been in an era of “neolib- 635
eral globalization” or “neoliberal capitalism” since the
1980s has become something of an intellectual truism, es-
tablished as a given intellectual proposition by virtue of
frequent enunciation. Andrew Kipnis (2007) has observed
that the number of articles in leading anthropological jour- 640
nals using the term “neoliberal” increased from less than
10 percent in the decade prior to 2002 to 35 percent of
articles published between 2002 and 2005. Nonini (2008,
149) notes that:
The term “neoliberal” has recently appeared so frequently, 645
and been applied with such abandon, that it risks being used
to refer to almost any political, economic, social or cultural
process associated with contemporary capitalism. . . . A term
with so many meanings obviously has great utility, because
most progressive scholars can agree that whatever neoliber- 650
alism is, they don’t like it, and the ambiguity of the term
allows discursive coalitions of the like-minded to form with-
out the troublesome bother of having to clarify exactly what
it is they oppose or are critical of.
The limits of neoliberalism as a general explanatory 655
framework for global capitalism since the 1980s are ev-
ident in the case of China. Contrary to Harvey’s (2005)
account of Chinese developments since 1980 as “neo-
liberalism with Chinese characteristics,” Nonini (2008)
argues that the depth of official commitment to private 660
property rights, free markets, and free trade—to take three
8 T. FLEW AND S. CUNNINGHAM
baseline commitments of neoliberalism—is limited, con-
tingent, and reversible, particularly if enhancement of any
of these were to challenge the power of the Chinese Com-
munist party-state. Moreover, he argues that popular sup-665
port for a neoliberal policy program in China is virtually
nonexistent, reflecting the historically weak position of
liberalism as a political philosophy in Chinese society,
and that while there may be some support for a “weak”
variant of neoliberalism based around support for markets,670
entrepreneurship, and consumerist values, “the strong ver-
sion of neoliberalism does not exist in China as a hege-
monic project” (ibid., 168). China may be an exceptional
case, given its size, its rapid growth rates since 1978, and
its significance in the global economy. Moreover, inso-675
far as the Chinese case has parallels, it is in the gener-
ally strong support found for the “developmental state” in
Asian capitalist systems (Weiss 2003).
Rather than debating the Chinese case at length, the
point in raising it is to draw attention to the extent to680
which universalizing claims about neoliberalism may in
fact rest upon a kind of Marxist functionalism, whereby
an all-encompassing dominant ideology is developed to
“serve” capital in its latest phase, which is deemed to be
global and flexible. Nonini (2008, 151) proposes down-685
sizing our claims about neoliberalism and giving them
historical, geographical, and cultural specificity. Other-
wise, the real risk exists of “assuming that flexible cap-
italism brings about the very political conditions within
nation-states of deregulation and privatisation etc., which690
it needs for maximum capital accumulation, and . . . that
flexible ‘capital’ has a universal global capacity to do so,
and that to do so is somehow ‘neo-liberal’ governance,
restructuring, domination etc., wherever it occurs in the
world.” We can note here Will Hutton’s argument that695
China requires an “Enlightenment infrastructure” in or-
der to properly develop capitalism, and that “China will
only be able to truly compete with the West if it be-
comes more like us.” The response of economist Megh-
nad Desai to the claim that there is one “true” capital-700
ism based on individualism, liberty, and pluralism that
China needs to adopt, is that “Capitalism... has accommo-
dated a variety of institutional arrangements and only in
the most recent phase of globalization have we thought
that an Anglo-Saxon style liberal democracy is its sine705
qua non” (Hutton and Desai 2007). In light of the wideQ2
range of work that has sought to critically evaluate dif-
ferent national capitalisms and their responses to glob-
alization (see, e.g., Perraton and Clift 2004), we would
share Kipnis’s (2007, 387) observation that “to naı¨vely710
draw upon all types of analyses of neo-liberalism with-
out noting their contradictions leads to a hodgepodge sort
of analysis in which the world as a whole and every-
thing in it appears to belong to a single theoretical cate-
gory.”1715
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES BEYOND CARICATURES
If we move beyond the crude claim that invoking Tony
Blair or “New Labour” proves in itself the neoliberal
provenance of creative industries, consideration needs to
be given to how evidence of neoliberal strategies manifest 720
themselves in various policies and forms of policy dis-
course. There is certainly considerable talk about markets,
entrepreneurship, competition, and innovation in creative
industries policies, but it has been noted that this was not
a new thing: Cultural policy since the 1970s had been 725
moving from a supply-side, artist-centered approach to
one that gave stronger consideration to consumer demand
and cultural markets. One distinctive feature of creative
industries as a policy discourse—if not necessarily poli-
cies as actually applied in the arts and media sectors— 730
has been increased attention given to the nature of small-
to-medium enterprises (SMEs) in the creative industries.
Although arts policy has often been oriented toward flag-
ship cultural institutions and major events, and political
economists have focused upon the largest commercial and 735
public sector media conglomerates—what Nick Couldry
refers to as “the myth of the mediated centre” (Couldry
2006)—the creative industries have come to evolve what
has been termed an “hourglass” structure, with a small
number of major players in each sector sitting alongside 740
a myriad of individual enterprises, small companies, and
networks of creative talent (Deuze 2006). As these indi-
viduals and small groups are relatively new and not highly
concentrated, and as “portfolio careers” characterized by
multiple jobs across different sectors are often the norm 745
for these segments of the creative workforce, they lack
the political power and lobbying clout of big corpora-
tions, established trade unions, and traditional arts orga-
nizations. Yet there is growing evidence that such loosely
configured creative networks are a core source of innova- 750
tion in the arts, media, and culture, and the challenge has
been raised of how policy frameworks can best support
such networks that differs from the traditional large-scale
institutional domains of media and cultural policies and
politics. 755
Another distinctive issue has been how the Internet
and digital media production and distribution models are
changing the producer-consumer dichotomy that has long
characterized mass communication models and critical
theories of the mass media. While cultural studies theo- 760
rists and critical political economists have long debated the
capacity for autonomous agency among media consumers
using the products distributed by mass media corporations,
the rise of what Yochai Benkler (2006) terms social pro-
duction models based around collaborative networks and 765
peer production are generating new sources of competi-
tion, conflict, and contradiction at the heart of industries
connected to information, knowledge, communication,
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culture, and creativity, which are themselves moving to the
center of twenty-first-century economies. Benkler (ibid.,770
122) observes that “social production in general and peer
production in particular present new sources of compe-
tition to incumbents that produce information goods for
which there are now socially produced substitutes.” This
requires a different approach to the politics of media re-775
form, focused not only on the regulation of media corpo-
rations and provision of support for public service media,
but also on new flashpoint issues such as the future of
copyright and intellectual property law, open-source ver-
sus proprietary software, user-generated media content,780
and questions of open access to repositories of creative
content. As Henry Jenkins observes, in what he refers to
as convergence culture, “the potentials of a more partici-
patory media culture are worth fighting for . . . [as] conver-
gence culture is throwing media into flux, expanding the785
opportunities for grassroots groups to speak back to the
mass media” (Jenkins 2006, 248). While such concerns
have been caricatured as claims that creativity and tech-
nology will in and of themselves trump corporate power
structures (e.g., Miller 2009), there seem to be very im-790
portant and current political questions arising out of such
power shifts between users and distributors of digital cul-
tural content.
Finally, there is the role of public-sector cultural in-
stitutions in the creative economy. The implications of795
creative industries theories and policy discourses are not
necessarily neoliberal ones that “cement the victory of
private over public interests” or “limit the scope of public
service broadcasting and reduce it to a ghettoized cor-
ner of the broadcast market where private operators have800
no desire (and no compulsion) to go” (Freedman 2008,
224). By pointing to a positive correlation between the
development of culture and the creative industries and
economic growth and innovation, rather than seeing cul-
tural provision as a rent extracted from the “real” or “pro-805
ductive” economy on the basis of social or cultural value
rationales alone, we can begin to think about such cul-
tural institutions as public-sector social innovation incu-
bators (Cunningham 2009a). Governments can use their
more direct leverage over these institutions to establish810
them as leading-edge sites for innovations around user-
generated content, open access, and a more participatory
media culture, and they can operate as a fulcrum for wider
changes in the cultural sphere. This is not to say that
the influence of governments will invariably be a benign815
one—the long and debilitating “culture wars” in coun-
tries such as the United States and Australia indicate the
extent to which such cultural institutions can be hobbled
for perceived political gain—or that such initiative will
not be resisted from within the organizational culture of820
such large, well-established cultural institutions. But it
is to say that creative industries theories and policy dis-
courses are not defined by an ideological preference for
large commercial institutions over those of the public sec-
tor. Rather, they can act as an advocate for the contri- 825
bution of SMEs, and for the formative role of public-
sector cultural institutions as cultural questions move to
the fore of globalized knowledge-based economies and
societies.
NOTE 830
1. Such a problem pervades Freedman’s (2008, 223) account of
the politics of media policy in Britain the Blair government and the
United States during the Bush administration. Despite the author’s
concerns about “the tendency to treat neo-liberalism as an undifferen-
tiated ‘bogeyman’ of contemporary capitalism,” it can be argued that 835
his account of a diverse range of media policies in the two countries as
variants of neoliberalism becomes precisely this. This is most marked
in his analysis of public broadcasting, where the overt politicization
and defunding of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) by the Bush
administration in the United States is seen as being essentially similar 840
to the Blair government’s promotion of new market opportunities for
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). In this and other cases
in the book, such as content regulation and censorship, quite different
policies are approached as evidence of “the emergence of varieties of
neo-liberalism . . . [where] states are experimenting with and internal- 845
izing different aspects of the neo-liberal agenda, contributing to the
emergence of ‘diversity within convergence.”’ In other words, even
when policies would appear to be quite different, they are in fact quite
the same, all explicable under the rubric of variants of neoliberalism!
For a critical review of Freedman, see Flew (2009). 850
REFERENCES
Americans for the Arts. 2008. Research services: Creative industries.
http://www.artsusa.org/information services/research/services/cre-
ative industries/default.asp (accessed August 13, 2009).
Barrowclough, D., and Z. Kozul-Wright. 2008. Creative industries and 855
developing countries: Voice, choice and economic growth. London:
Routledge.
Benkler, Y. 2006. The wealth of networks: How social production
transforms markets and freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press. 860
Bennett, T. 1998. Culture: A reformer’s science. Sydney: Allen &
Unwin.
Bilton, C., and R. Leary. 2002. What managers can do for creativity:
Brokering creativity in the creative industries. International Journal
of Cultural Policy 8:49–64. 865
Caves, R. 2000. Creative industries: Between art and commerce.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Couldry, N. 2006. Transvaluing media studies: Or, beyond the myth
of the mediating centre. In Media and cultural theory, ed. J. Curran
and D. Morley, 177–94. London: Routledge. 870
Coyle, D. 1998. The weightless world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Craik, J. 2007. Re-visioning arts and cultural policy: Current impasses
and future directions. Canberra: Australian National University e-
Press.
10 T. FLEW AND S. CUNNINGHAM
Cunningham, S. 1992. Framing culture: Criticism and policy in875
Australia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
———. 2002. From cultural to creative industries: Theory, industry
and policy implications. Media International Australia 102:57–67.
———. 2007. Creative industries as policy and discourse outside the
United Kingdom. Global Media and Communication 3:347–52.880
———. 2008. Creative industries as a globally contestable policy field.
Chinese Journal of Communication 2:13–24.
Cunningham, S., and P. Higgs. 2008. Creative industries mapping:
Where have we come from and where are we going? Creative In-
dustries Journal 1:7–30.885
Cunningham, S., J. Banks, and J. Potts. 2008. Cultural economy: The
shape of the field. In Cultural economy, ed. Herman Anheier and
Yudhishthir Raj Isar, 15–26. London: Sage.
———. 2009a. Reinventing television: The work of the ‘innovation’
unit. In TV studies after TV, ed. Graeme Turner and Jinna Tay, 83–92.890
London: Routledge.
———. 2009b. Trojan horse or Rorschach blot? Creative Industries
discourse around the world. International Journal of Cultural Policy.Q3
Curran, J. 2006. Media and cultural theory in the age of market lib-
eralism. In Media and cultural theory, ed. James Curran and David895
Morley, 129–48. London: Routledge.
David, P., and D. Foray. 2002. An introduction to the economy of the
knowledge society. International Social Science Journal 171:9–23.
Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 1998. Creative in-
dustries mapping document. http://www.culture.gov.uk/creative/900
creative industries.html (accessed May 5, 2001).Q4
Deuze, M. 2006. Media work. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Donald, J. 2004. What’s new: A letter to Terry Flew. Continuum: Jour-
nal of Media and Cultural Studies 18:235–46.
Edgar, A. 2008. Culture industries. In Cultural theory: The key con-905
cepts, ed. Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick, 83–84. London: Rout-
ledge.
Flew, T. 2002. Beyond ad hocery: Defining the creative industries.
Proceedings Cultural Sites, Cultural Theory, Cultural Policy, Second
International Conference of Cultural Policy Research, Wellington,910
New Zealand, January 23–26, ed. Michael Volkerling, 181–191.
———. 2005a. Creative economy. In Creative industries, ed. John
Hartley, 344–360. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.
———. 2005b. Sovereignty and software: Rethinking cultural policy in
a global creative economy. International Journal of Cultural Policy915
11: 243–60.
———. 2006. The social contract and beyond in broadcast media
policy. Television and New Media 7:282–305.
———. 2009. A game of two halves [Review of Des Freedman, The
Politics of Media Policy]. Australian Journalism Review 30:125–27.920
Freedman, D. 2008. The politics of media policy. Cambridge. Polity.
Galloway, S., and S. Dunlop. 2007. A critique of definitions of the cul-
tural and creative industries in public policy. International Journal
of Cultural Policy 13:17–31.
Garnham, N. 1987. Concepts of culture: Public policy and the cultural925
industries. Cultural Studies 1:23–37.
———. 2005. From cultural to creative industries: An analysis of the
implications of the “creative industries” approach to the arts and
media policy making in the United Kingdom. International Journal
of Cultural Policy 11(1):15–29.930
Hartley, J. 2005. Introduction. In Creative industries, ed. John Hartley,
1–39. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Hassan, R. 2008. The information society. Cambridge: Polity.
Hesmondhalgh, D. 2007. The cultural industries, 2nd ed. London:
Sage. 935
———. 2008. Cultural and creative industries. In The Sage handbook of
cultural analysis, ed. Tony Bennett and John Frow, 552–69. London:
Sage.
Hesmondhalgh, D, and A. Pratt. 2005. Cultural industries and cul-
tural policy. International Journal of Cultural Policy 11(1):1– 940
13.
Higgs, P., S. Cunningham, and H. Bakhshi. 2008. Beyond the creative
industries: Mapping the creative economy in the United Kingdom.
London: NESTA.
Holden, J. 2007. Publicly-funded culture and the creative industries. 945
London: DEMOS.
Hutton, W., and M. Desai. 2007. Does the future really belong to
China? Prospect Magazine 130 (January). http://www.prospect-
magazine.co.uk/article details.php?id = 8174 (accessed 8 April
2009). 950
Jenkins, H. 2006. Convergence culture: Where old and new media
collide. New York: New York University Press.
KEA European Affairs. 2006. The economy of culture in Europe.
Study prepared for the Directorate-General for Education and
Culture, European Commission. Brussels: KEA European Af- 955
fairs. http://www.keanet.eu/ecoculturepage.html (accessed April 13,
2009).
Keane, M. 2007. Created in China: The great new leap forward. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Kellner, D. 2009. Media industries, political economy, and me- 960
dia/cultural studies: an articulation. In Media industries: History,
theory and method, ed. J. Holt and A. Perren, 95–107. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Kipnis, A. 2007. Neo-liberalism reified: Suzhi discourse and tropes
of neo-liberalism in the People’s Republic of China. Journal of the 965
Royal Anthropological Institute 13:383–400.
Kong, L., C. Gibson, L.-M. Khoo, and A.-M. Semple. 2006. Knowl-
edge of the creative economy: Towards a relational geography of
diffusion and adaptation in Asia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47:173–
94. 970
McChesney, R. 2008. The political economy of media: Enduring issues,
emerging dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review.
McQuire, S. 2001. When is art IT? In The fibreculture reader: Poli-
tics of a digital present, ed. H. Brown et al., 205–12. Melbourne:
Fibreculture Publications. Q5975
Miller, T. 2002. A view from a fossil: The new economy, creativity and
consumption—Two or three things I don’t believe in. International
Journal of Cultural Studies 7:55–65.
———. 2009. Can natural Luddites make things explode or travel
faster? The new humanities, cultural policy studies, and creative 980
industries. In Media Industries: history, theory and method, ed. J.
Holt and A. Perren, 184–98. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Mitchell, W., A. Inouye, and M. Blumenthal. 2003. Beyond productiv-
ity: Information technology, innovation, and creativity. Washington,
DC: National Academies. 985
Nonini, D. 2008. Is China becoming neo-liberal? Critique of Anthro-
pology 28:145–76.
O’Connor, J. 2007. The cultural and creative industries: A review of the
literature (Report for Creative Partnerships). London: Arts Council
England. 990
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES DEBATE 11
Perraton, J, and B. Clift. 2004. So Where are national capitalisms now?
In Where are national capitalisms now? ed. J. Perraton and B. Clift,
195–260. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pratt, A. 2005. Cultural industries and public policy. International
Journal of Cultural Policy 11(1):31–44.995
———. 2009. The creative and cultural economy and the recession.
Geoforum 40:495–96.
Rifkin, J. 2000. The age of access. London: Penguin.
Roodhouse, S. 2001. Have the cultural industries a role to play in re-
gional regeneration and a nation’s wealth? In Proceedings of AIMAC1000
2001: 6th International Conference on Arts and Cultural Manage-
ment, ed. J. Radbourne, 457–66. Brisbane: Faculty of Business,
Queensland University of Technology.
Rose, N. 1999. Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.1005
Ross, A. 2007. Nice work if you can get it: The mercurial career of
creative industries policy. In My creativity reader: A critique of cre-
ative industries, ed. G. Lovink and N. Rossiter, 17–39. Amsterdam:
Institute of Network Cultures.
Rossiter, N. 2006. Organized networks: Media theory, creative labour,1010
new institutions. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
Rudd, K. 2009. The global financial crisis. The Monthly 42.Q6
Scholte, J. A. 2005. The sources of neo-liberal globalization Overar-
ching Concerns Paper No. 8. United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, Geneva, Switzerland.
Siwek, S. 2006. Copyright industries in the U.S. economy. Washington, 1015
DC: International Intellectual Property Alliance.
Throsby, D. 2001. Economics and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
———. 2008. Modelling the cultural industries. International Journal
of Cultural Policy 14:217–32. 1020
Towse, R. 2003. Cultural industries. In A handbook of cultural eco-
nomics, ed. R. Towse, 170–76. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
United Nations Committee on Trade, Aid and Development. 2008.
Creative economy report 2008. Geneva: UNCTAD.
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation. 1025
2007. The 2009 UNESCO framework for cultural statistics (Draft).
Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
Weiss, L. 2003. Bringing domestic institutions back in. In States in
the global economy: Bringing domestic institutions back in, ed. L.
Weiss, 1–37. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1030
Wyszominski, M. J. 2008. The local creative economy in the United
States. In Cultural economy, ed. H. Anheier and Y. Raj Isar, 199–212.
London: Sage.
